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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
000O000 
WILLIAM R. OLSEN and 
AUDREY OLSEN, 
Plaintiffs/Appellees, 
v* 
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF 
SOUTH SALT LAKE CITY, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
000O000 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal from a final judgment of the 
Third Judicial District Court is conferred on this court by Utah 
Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(k) (1992). 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The only issue presented for review is whether appellant 
Redevelopment Agency of South Salt Lake City (the "RDA") lacks the 
authority to acquire appellees William R. Olsen and Audrey Olsen's 
(the "Olsens") property as a result of the expiration of the 
applicable statute of limitations. This Court reviews the order 
granting the Olsens1 Motion for Summary Judgment by determining 
whether the Olsens are entitled to judgment as a matter of law, 
without deference to the trial court1s legal conclusions. Arrow 
Indus, v. Zions First National Bank, 767 P.2d 935, 936-37 (Utah 
1988). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
The only determinative is the 1983 version of Utah Code Ann* 
§11-19-9.5(5)(a): 
(5) A redevelopment plan adopted after April 1, 
1983, shall contain: 
(a) A time limit not to exceed seven years from the 
date of the approval of the plan after which the agency 
may not commence acquisition of property through eminent 
domain; 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Nature of the Case 
This is an action for declaratory relief. The Olsens sought 
judgment quieting title to their property through the court's 
declaration that the RDA lacks the authority to condemn or 
otherwise acquire the property. 
The Olsens filed their Complaint on February 22, 1993. The 
Complaint states six causes of action, including a statute of 
limitations claim based on Utah Code Ann. §11-19-9.5(5)(a) (1983). 
On April 7, 1993 the Olsens filed their Motion for Summary 
Judgment, asserting only the statute of limitations claim. The 
Olsens argued that the RDA lacks the power to condemn or otherwise 
acquire the subject property for failure to commence acquisition 
within the applicable seven year period. 
The parties filed opposing and reply memoranda, and the matter 
was submitted for decision without oral argument. On May 25, 1993, 
Judge Richard H. Moffat issued his Minute Entry granting the 
2 
Olsens1 Motion for Summary Judgment. The Order and Judgment for 
Costs appealed from was entered by Judge Moffat on June 29, 1993. 
Statement of Facts 
1. The Olsens have owned Lots 97 and 98, Block 1, Southgate 
Plat "A," located on Malvern Avenue in South Salt Lake City, Utah 
(the "property") since prior to 1977. (R. 29.J1 
2. On November 20, 1985, the RDA adopted a redevelopment plan 
which authorizes the acquisition of approximately twenty acres in 
South Salt Lake City through eminent domain. The property is part 
of the twenty acres. As required by Utah Code Ann. §11-19-
9.5(5)(a) (1983), the redevelopment plan contains several 
"limitations on the power" of the RDA including: 
A time limit of 7 years from the date of the approval of 
the plan after which the Agency shall not commence 
acquisition of property through eminent domain. 
Metro-Center Neighborhood Development Plan at 12. (R. 29.) 
3. The RDA's statutory power of eminent domain expired not 
later than December 3, 1992, seven years after the effective date 
of the redevelopment plan.2 (R. 29.) 
1
 The references to the record are, for the most part, 
references to the statement of "undisputed Material Facts" found in 
the Olsens' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. 
(R. 28 - 63.) The RDA disputed none of the statements in the 
Olsens1 "Undisputed Material Facts." (R. 64-67, 134.) 
2
 Although the redevelopment plan was adopted on November 20, 
1985, the RDA claims its effective date is December 3, 1985. 
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4. On or about November 10, 1992, the RDA filed a 
condemnation lawsuit in the Third District Court captioned 
Redevelopment Agency of South Salt Lake City v. Olsen & Peterson 
Consulting Engineers, Civil No. 920906324 (the "condemnation 
case"). The case was assigned to Judge John A- Rokich. (R. 30.) 
5. The condemnation case purportedly concerned lots 9, 10, 
11, 12, 97 and 98, Block 1# Southgate Plat "A." (R. 30.) 
6. Olsen & Peterson Consulting Engineers is the only named 
defendant in the condemnation case although Olsen & Peterson 
Consulting Engineers only owns four of the six lots sought to be 
condemned in that case. The two lots not owned by Olsen & Peterson 
Consulting Engineers, Lots 97 and 98, are owned by the Olsens and 
is the property which is the subject of this action. (R. 30.) 
7. The RDA never sued the Olsens. The RDA took no steps to 
make the Olsens parties in the condemnation case until filing a 
motion to amend on March 10, 1993, more than three months after the 
expiration of the statute of limitations. The RDA claims that it 
failed to sue the Olsens within the limitations period as a result 
of an "inadvertent" omission. (R. 30.) 
8. The RDA knew that the Olsens owned the property at least 
two years before the RDA filed its complaint in the condemnation 
case. On October 24, 1990, the RDA passed a resolution authorizing 
the acquisition of the property by condemnation. The resolution, 
a copy of which is attached to the RDA's Complaint in the 
4 
condemnation case, lists the Olsens as "owners of record." 
(R. 30.) 
9. Prior to 1911, Mr. Olsen was a principal of Olsen & 
Peterson Consulting Engineers. In 1977 he sold his interest in the 
corporation and retired. (R. 31.) 
10. Since 1977, the Olsens have had no relationship with 
Olsen & Peterson Consulting Engineers other than as landlords of 
the property, which is leased to Olsen & Peterson Consulting 
Engineers. The Olsens own no stock in the company, have no role in 
its management, receive no income from the company and have not 
been employed by the company since 1977. (R. 31.) 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The argument section of the RDAfs opening brief makes 
confusing references to proceedings in the condemnation case, 
Redevelopment Agency of South Salt Lake City v. Olsen & Peterson 
Consulting Engineers, Civil No. 920906324.3 A brief review of the 
proceedings in the condemnation case will aid the Court's 
understanding of this matter. 
The RDA filed its Complaint in the condemnation case on 
November 10, 1992. The defendant in the case, Olsen & Peterson 
Consulting Engineers, answered the Complaint on December 18, 1992, 
3
 For example, the RDA's conclusion asks this Court to "allow 
the RDA to amend its Complaint to assert as additional defendants 
in the condemnation proceedings WILLIAM AND AUDREY OLSEN." Brief 
of Appellant at 10. 
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affirmatively alleging "that it has no ownership interest in lots 
97 and 98, but only a leasehold interest." (R. 99.) Discovery 
proceeded until, on March 10, 1993, the RDA filed its motion 
requesting leave to amend and bring in the Olsens as defendants. 
(R. 104 - 106.) 
In the interim, the Olsens had filed their Complaint in the 
present matter. (R. 2 - 7.) On March 18, 1993, the RDA filed 
their Motion to Consolidate in the condemnation case, seeking 
consolidation with this case. (R. 118 - 123.) 
The Olsens filed their Motion for Summary Judgment in this 
case on April 7, 1993. The RDA's opposing memorandum, filed on 
April 22, 1993, requests the trial court to withhold its decision 
on the Motion for Summary Judgment until Judge Rokich's decision on 
the then pending Motion to Amend and Motion to Consolidate. On May 
7, 1993, Judge Rokich issued a Minute Entry in which he reserved 
ruling on the motions pending Judge Moffatfs ruling on the Olsens1 
Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 241.) 
On May 25, 1993, Judge Moffat issued his minute entry granting 
the Olsens1 Motion for Summary Judgment. On June 17, 1993, the 
parties entered into a stipulation in the condemnation case 
agreeing that the Motion to Amend and Motion to Consolidate were 
rendered moot by Judge Moffat's ruling on the Motion for Summary 
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Judgment.4 The parties jointly moved Judge Rokich for an order 
denying the Motion to Amend and Motion to Consolidate, and Judge 
Rokich granted the motion on July 13, 1993.5 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Utah Code Ann. §11-19-9.5(5)(a) (1983), provides that a 
redevelopment plan adopted after April 1, 1993, "shall contain a 
time limit not to exceed seven years from the date of the approval 
of the plan after which the agency may not commence acquisition of 
property through eminent domain.f|6 The redevelopment plan which 
authorized the RDA to acquire the property that is the subject of 
this lawsuit was approved no later than December 3, 1985. 
Consequently, the RDAfs statutory power of eminent domain expired 
on December 3, 1992, long before the RDA took any action to acquire 
the property from the Olsens. 
The RDA claims that it did not sue the Olsens because, through 
"inadvertence," it mistakenly believed that Olsen & Peterson 
Consulting Engineers owned all six lots. (R. 112) The RDA's 
"inadvertent" mistake does not excuse its failure to sue the 
Olsens, and does not override the policy of finality behind the 
4
 Certified copies of the Stipulation and the resulting Order 
in Judge Rokich1s case are included in the addendum to this brief. 
5
 Id. 
6
 Utah Code Ann. §17A-2-1210.5 (1993) is the current version 
of the statute of limitations. Section 17A-2-1210.5 imports a five 
year limitation on projects for which preliminary plans are adopted 
after April 1, 1993. 
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statute of limitations. The trial court was correct in so ruling 
as a matter of law. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE EMINENT DOMAIN STATUTE DOES NOT MANDATE JOINDER OF 
OWNERS WHO ARE BEYOND THE REACH OF THE STATUTE. 
The only issue presented by the Olsens' motion was whether the 
statute of limitations barred any attempt to acquire the property 
by power of eminent domain. The RDA conceded the applicability of 
the statute, but argued that certain exceptions to the statute 
should apply to allow joinder of the Olsens as defendants in the 
condemnation case. 
The RDA makes the same arguments on appeal. For example, the 
RDA argues that since eminent domain proceedings "must include, as 
defendants, all persons who are fowners1 . . . of the property 
being acquired," and the condemnation case is an eminent domain 
proceeding, Mr. and Mrs. Olsen as "owners" must be joined. Brief 
of Appellant at 7. The reasoning is circular. Obviously, if the 
RDA is to acquire property through eminent domain, it must sue the 
owners of the property. But the issue is not who must be joined, 
but whether the RDA has the authority to acquire the property after 
the expiration of the statute of limitations. Having failed to sue 
the owners within the seven year period in which it is empowered to 
bring a condemnation suit, the RDA's authority to acquire the 
property through eminent domain is extinguished. 
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The RDA's argument based on the indispensable party doctrine 
found in U.R.Civ.P. 19(a) is also circular. Again, the argument is 
premised on the assumption that the RDA is entitled to take the 
Olsens' property. Obviously, if the RDA still has eminent domain 
authority over the property, Mr. and Mrs. Olsen, as owners, are 
indispensable parties. But the assumption is false. The RDA's 
authority to acquire the property expired prior to the time it 
sought leave to add Mr. and Mrs. Olsen as parties in the 
condemnation case. 
POINT II: THE RELATION BACK DOCTRINE DOES NOT ALLOW THE ADDITION OF 
NEW PARTIES AFTER THE RUNNING OF THE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS. 
The RDA next argues that its claim against the Olsens should 
relate back to the filing of the complaint in the condemnation case 
pursuant to U.R.Civ.P. 15(c). Rule 15(c) does not apply under 
these circumstances: 
Generally Rule 15(c), U.R.C.P., will not apply to an 
amendment which substitutes or adds new parties for those 
brought before the court by the original pleadings - -
whether plaintiff or defendant. This [is] for the reason 
that such would amount to the assertion of a new cause of 
action, and if such were allowed to relate back to the 
filing of the complaint, the purpose of a statute of 
limitation would be defeated. 
Doxey-Layton Co. v. Clark, 548 P.2d 902, 906 (Utah 1976). 
A narrow exception to this rule exists where the old and new 
parties have an "identity of interest." Id. In Perry v. Pioneer 
Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 214 (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme 
Court defined the phrase as follows: 
9 
11
 Identity of interest11 as used in this context means that 
the parties are so closely related in their business 
operations that notice of the action against one serves 
to provide notice of the action to the other. 
Id. at 217. The Court in Perry cites Spiker v. Eooqeboom, 628 P.2d 
177, 179 (Colo.App. 1981) for the proposition that an "identity of 
interest11 exists between past and present forms of the same 
enterprise. Spiker involved an action by a homeowner against a 
construction company to recover for structural defects. After 
discovering during a deposition that the construction company was 
not incorporated until after the homeowner purchased the property, 
and that prior to incorporation the company was operated as a 
partnership# the homeowner filed a motion to substitute the 
individual partners for the corporate defendant. After granting 
the homeowner1s motion# the trial court granted summary judgment 
for the individual partners based upon a failure to substitute the 
individual partners within the applicable statute of limitations.7 
The Court of Appeals reversed, noting that a sufficient 
"identity of interest" existed between the corporation and the 
partnership: 
Here, there is sufficient identity of interest between 
the corporation and the partnership to demonstrate that 
the partnership would not be prejudiced in being 
substituted for the corporation as defendant. The 
Hoogebooms were the sole partners in the Hoogeboom 
Construction Co. and are shareholders in the same 
business enterprise which was incorporated under the same 
name. . . . Moreover, service was made on a partner, 
7
 Spiker v. Kooqeboom, 628 P.2d 177, 178 (Colo.App. 1981). 
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albeit in his position as president of the corporation. 
Notice to a partner serves as notice to the partnership. 
. . . In addition, defendants misled plaintiff into 
thinking that the corporation was the proper party by 
admitting in the answer that the corporation sold the 
house to plaintiff. 
Id. at 179. 
No similar identity of interest exists in this case. Although 
Mr. Olsen was a principal of Olsen & Peterson Consulting Engineers 
some sixteen years ago, he did not retain an interest in the 
corporation when he retired in 1977. Furthermore, service was 
never made on Mr. Olsen, unlike the partner and former corporate 
president of the defendant in Spiker. Finally, the RDA was not 
misled into thinking that Olsen & Peterson Consulting Engineers was 
the only proper party in the condemnation case. Unlike the 
defendants in Spiker, Olsen & Peterson Consulting Engineers 
asserted in its answer that it was not the owner of Lots 97 and 98. 
(R. 99) 
Olsen & Peterson Consulting Engineers' admission that it did 
not own the lots was, of course, a fact already known to the RDA. 
This prior knowledge brings the case squarely within the holding of 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Kilkenny v. Arco Marine Inc., 
800 F.2d 853 (1986), a case cited with approval and discussed at 
length by this Court in Vina v. Jefferson Ins. Co. of New York, 761 
P.2d 581, 587 (1988). In Kilkenny, a motion to amend was denied 
because the plaintiff knew the identity of the new defendants prior 
to the expiration of the statute of limitations. Therefore, it 
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could not be said that the proposed new parties knew or should have 
known that, but for a mistake, they would have been named as 
defendants. The court concluded that: 
Rule 15(c) was intended to protect the plaintiff who 
mistakenly names a party and then discovers, after the 
relevant statute of limitations has run, the identity of 
the proper party. Rule 15(c) was never intended to 
assist a plaintiff who ignores or fails to respond in a 
reasonable fashion to notice of a potential party. . . . 
(Emphasis added.) 
Kilkenny, 800 F.2d at 857-8. The RDA knew the Olsens owned the 
property prior to the running of the limitations period but simply 
ignored the knowledge. The identity of interest doctrine was never 
intended to apply in these circumstances. 
In summary, the purpose of the statute of limitations is 
outweighed by the purpose of the relation back doctrine in the 
proper case. Thus, an amendment will relate back despite the 
expiration of the limitations period when an "identity of interest" 
exists. In the condemnation case, however, the purpose of Rule 
15(c) is not advanced. There is no "identity of interest." 
Accordingly, there is no reason to thwart the purpose of the 
statute of limitations. The RDA knew of the Olsens as potential 
parties yet failed "to respond in a reasonable fashion. ..." Id. 
The trial court was correct in its ruling on this issue. 
POINT III: FAILURE TO JOIN SHOULD NOT BE CURED BY AMENDMENT 
WHEN THE 8TATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAS RUN. 
The RDA cites U.R.Civ.P. 15(a) for the proposition that leave 
to amend should be "readily granted." Under normal circumstances, 
12 
this is true. Under normal circumstances, the RDA's citation to 
Nichols on Eminent Domain for the proposition that failure to join 
is customarily cured by amendment may be persuasive. 
Under the unique circumstances here, however, different rules 
apply. First, the specific provisions of Rule 15(c) and its 
interpreting case law govern over the more general provisions of 
Rule 15(a). Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 214, 
216 (Utah 1984). When the issue is whether an amendment will 
relate back, the general proposition that leave to amend should be 
"readily granted" is considered, if at all, only after application 
of the relation back rules. Second, the reference to Nichols on 
Eminent Domain is nothing more than a restatement of Rule 15(a) in 
the eminent domain context. What matters in this case is that 
Nichols does not propose that failure to join all owners may be 
cured by amendment when the statute of limitations has run. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court was correct in concluding as a matter of law 
that the power of eminent domain granted to the RDA by statute 
expired no later than December 3, 1992, months before any action by 
13 
the RDA to bring a condemnation proceeding against the Olsens. The 
trial court1s Order and Judgment for Costs should be affirmed. 
DATED this day of December, 1993 
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
CRAIG G. ADAMSON 
ERIC P. LEE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the ' ~> day of December, 1993, a 
true and accurate copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
Harold A. Hintze 
GARDINER & HINTZE 
60 East South Temple, Suite 1680N 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
William D. Oswald 
OSWALD & FEIL 
201 South Main Street, 12th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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ADDENDUM 
15 
Craig G. Adamson (0024) 
Eric P. Lee (4870) 
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
310 South Main Street, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-6383 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
—oooOooo— 
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF : 
SOUTH SALT LAKE CITY, STIPULATION 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
OLSEN & PETERSON CONSULTING Civil No. 920906324 
ENGINEERS, : 
Judge John A. Rokich 
Defendant. 
—oooOooo— 
The parties hereby stipulate as follows: 
1. On May 25, 1993, the Honorable Richard H. Moffat granted plaintiffs' Motion for 
Summary Judgment in William R. Olsen and Audrey Olsen v. Redevelopment Agency of South 
Salt Lake Gty, Case No. 930900965 PR. 
2. As a result, the Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint and Motion to 
Consolidate filed in this matter by plaintiff are rendered moot. 
T< xr'tzt 
Jul J 5 1993 
to- * f* * %f wMjTft 
3. The parties jointly move the Court for an order denying the Motion for Leave to File 
Amended Complaint and Motion to Consolidate. 
DATED this \^X d ay of June, 1993 
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
CRAICTG. ADAMSON 
ERIC P. LEE 
Attorneys for defendant 
DATED this day of June, 1993 
GARDINER & HINTZE 
HAROLD A. HINTZE 
Attorneys for plaintiff 
_ _ . * . • » • YT>» «* COPY Or Wl 
DISTRICT : 0 » J O T b. L i 1 — w u ^ w CISTRIC 
«FWTAH. 
BATE: 
2 
Third Judicial District 
JUL 15 1993 
SAW..* •-Craig G. Adamson (0024) 
Eric P. Lee (4870)
 By. 
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
310 South Main Street, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-6383 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
—oooOooo— 
c*pu«y ciw* 
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF 
SOUTH SALT LAKE CITY, 
Plaintiff, 
OLSEN & PETERSON CONSULTING 
ENGINEERS, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 920906324 
Judge John A. Rokich 
—oooOooo—-
Pursuant to the Stipulation of the parties and good cause appearing, it is hereby 
ORDERED that plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint and plaintiffs 
Motion to Consolidate are denied. 
DATED this /A day of fc&? 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
'-**"? 1WAT TH» « 4 TRU? COPT OF AN 
JRICT 30U«T. SALT LAKE COUWTV.tSS 
fc / / • A., dLJc A. Rokich, District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the [7 day of June, 1993, a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Harold A. Hintze 
GARDINER & HINTZE 
60 East South Temple, Suite 1680N 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
William D. Oswald 
OSWALD & FEIL 
201 South Main Street, 12th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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